Stolen and phished credentials are still one of the most common ways attackers get in. Multi-factor authentication helps, but some kinds help more than others. A convincing fake login page can capture SMS codes and authenticator-app codes and relay them to the real site in real time. Passkeys close that gap. Here’s how they work and how to move to them without locking yourself out.
What a passkey is
A passkey is a login credential based on the FIDO2 and WebAuthn standards. Instead of a shared secret that you type, your device holds a private key, and the website holds only the matching public key. When you sign in, you unlock your device with your fingerprint, face or device PIN, and the device proves it has the private key.
That design has two advantages over a password. Nothing reusable is sent or stored, so a breach of the website leaks only public keys, which are useless to an attacker. And the passkey is bound to the real domain. A passkey created for login.example.com won’t work on login-example.co, and your browser won’t even offer it there, so a phishing page has nothing to capture. That is what “phishing-resistant” means.
Synced vs device-bound passkeys
Synced passkeys are backed up and synchronised by a platform or password manager: Apple’s iCloud Keychain, Google Password Manager, or a third-party manager such as 1Password or Bitwarden. If you lose your phone, they’re still there. That convenience makes them the right default for most people.
Device-bound passkeys live on one piece of hardware, typically a security key such as a YubiKey, and cannot be copied off it. They are the stronger choice for administrators and other high-risk accounts.
The US National Institute of Standards and Technology draws the same line in its latest digital identity guidelines, SP 800-63-4. Syncable authenticators are acceptable up to Authenticator Assurance Level 2, provided the sync service encrypts the keys and protects access to them with multi-factor authentication. The highest level, AAL3, requires a non-exportable key, which in practice means a device-bound authenticator.
A migration plan for a small organisation
Step 1 is to start with the accounts that matter most: email and the identity provider (Microsoft 365 and Entra ID, or Google Workspace), then admin consoles, banking, the domain registrar and DNS, the password manager, and backup systems.
Step 2 is hardware keys for admins. Give each administrator two security keys, one to carry and one stored safely as a backup, and register both before removing any other sign-in method.
Step 3 is rolling out synced passkeys to staff. Enable passkeys in your identity provider, then walk people through registering one on their phone or laptop in a short session. Most people are done in five minutes.
Step 4 is recovery, planned before you need it. Lost devices are the main operational risk. Make sure every user has at least two registered sign-in methods, and decide how IT verifies someone’s identity before resetting their access. Social engineers rely on helpdesks that accept a phone call alone as proof.
Step 5 is phasing out the weak methods. Once most people use passkeys, use conditional access or authentication-strength policies to require phishing-resistant methods for admins first, then for everyone. Remove SMS as a fallback where you can.
For your own accounts, today
- Add a passkey to your Google, Microsoft and Apple accounts.
- Add one to your password manager, if it supports passkey sign-in.
- Keep your existing recovery codes somewhere safe and offline.
Passwords won’t disappear overnight. Each account you move to a passkey is one a phishing email can no longer take from you.